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LIES AND LAYOFFS 
f 
Implicit contracts were initially seen as a form of insurance. Workers 
bought a less variable wage at the expense of a slightly lower average wage. 
But as long as this idea of implici t contracts persisted, they could do 
li ttle to explain unemployment. A risk-averse worker is unlikely to buy 
a ateadier 'Ñage if lt 13 at the increased risk 01' cosing his jobo He :night 
do so if the disutility of labour or the level of unemployment benefit were 
high enough, but in such cases we are effectively back with the classical 
version of unemployment. Indeed, as Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980) have shown, 
for a given amount of unemployment to be generated, unemployrnent benefi t 
must be higher in the implicit-contract case than it need be with spot 
auction markets. 
All this changed when asymmetric information was added to the mixture. Hart 
(1983) and Azariadis (1983) both take up the case where workers do not know 
the true state of demand for the firm' s product. They can, however, work 
out whether a particular contract wUl induce the firm to tell the truth 
about the state of demand, and such contracts are the only ones they wUl 
accep'C. 
~:lis .:'ules ou-c -::he con..:ract ',vhicn .nign't o-cherwiue be opcima.i -- cne ',.¡nere 
wages adjust to maintain full employrnent. For ir wages are flexible but 
employment fixed, rational employers will forever claim that demand is de-
pressed, thus ·cutting their costs wi thout affecting their revenues. If 
this is to be avoided, the firm too must suffer ir i t tells an untrue tale 
of woe. I t will only do so if i ts revenue ls reduced, and i ts revenue can 
only fall ir i t lays workers off. A contract '111 th f'lexible wages, then, 
must involve flexible p.mployment. 
1 
Despita the advanced mathematical dress in which this idea usually appears 
(see espeeia11y Hart (1983», i t appeals irnmediately to anyone who has e'ler 
had to listen to a sorrowful employer without being able to send the tears 
for ehemical analysis. It asks, howe'ler, to be embedded in a complete macro-
economic model and Frank (1986) has done the embedding. 
In Frank' s model there are two possi ble states 01' real demand, Q + and Q - • 
rJ.·, F'rank shows, always yields full employment. Truth-telling requires chat 
at Q + it is at Ieast as proí'itable to admi t demand is at Q + as to pretend 
that it is at Q-. Although workers are risk-neutral, firms are risk-averse 
in that they insist on a gi'len minimum profit even in the event 01' Q-. 
They must al so pay (and, as profit-maximisera, will only pay) their workera 
enough to stop them deserting to rival firms. Firma are monopoliatic eompet-
itors and thus face downward-sloping demand curves. 
These propositions suffice for Frank to derive a determinate "reaction curve" 
showing the level 01' output which will be generated at each level of demando 
Provided firms are sufficiently riak-averae, there will be a level of demand 
(besides the full-employrnent level) which generates a level of output equal 
to itaeIf -- an unemployment equilibrium. This unemployment equilibrium 
is influenced by, but ia not necessarily equal to " Q - • 
1'he limi ta-r;ions of 1rank' 3 model! however J are severe. 
care for hia assumption of risk-neutral workera and riak-averse firms. 
Unemployrnent equilibrium may and in Frank' a only illustrati ve example 
doea - require negative wages. But above a11 there is no reaaon why the 
"unemployment equilibrium" level of demand should correapond to Q- except 
throu.¡;h knife-edge luck; yet Q - ia suppoaed to be the only level of demand 
+ (except the fu11-employrnent-inducing Q) that anyone can countenance. In 
fact a double miracle is I'equired: rirat. firms have to expect the unique 
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level of Q which generates an unemployrnent equilibrium equal to itaelf. 
Secondly thia unique level must occur. If it does not do so, there ia no 
adjustment procesa: the expected level of demand, the actual level of demand, 
and the level of output which it generates are all different to one another, 
and no clue is given as to how, or whether, they are brought into lineo 
It is thus beside the point to complain that Frank' s unemployrnent equilibrium 
is "unstable" (as it appears to be from his reaction curve, diagram): if 
no adjustment process (or even non-adjustroent process) is specified, stabil-
ity and instability cease to have any meaning. 
It is the either/or nature of anticipated demand that is the source of the 
trouble. In the model presented below, firms have a continuous probabili ty 
distribution of expecteddemand, from zero. to the full-employrnent level 
of output. An adjustment process is specified and the possibility of both 
stable and unstable flex-price unemployrnent equilibria demonstrated. The 
unsatisfactory assumption of risk-neutral workers but risk-averse firms 
is no longer required. Nor shall we be issuing any unfortunates with a nega-
tive pay packet although, like Frank, we shall foster both analytical sim-
plicity and sturdy independence by abolishing unemployrnent benefit. 
II 
Assume that each firro starts with a team of N workers, any of whom can be N 
~mployed Qr ~aid off' 'lS ,~ircumstances dictate. I ..... ayof'fs, when they occur, 
are random. The utility of labour ia zero and there ia no unemployrnent bene-
fit. 
~irms are risk-averse to the extent that they always prefer a contract which 
guarantees breaking even to a contract which does not. 'I'Iorkers may be any-
thing from risk-neutral to infinitely risk-averse. 
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Firms are monopolistic competí tors. Each firm face3 an identical demand 
curve. Aggregate demand equals QF, where F is the number of firms. Hence 
aggregate demand per firm = Q. Let output per firm = q. 
Price is a non-linear function of Q/q: 
Le. p = (Q/q)c where O < c < 1 
Output is a not necessarily linear function of employment: 
Le. q = Nd/ 1- c ',.¡here d <1 (or competitivB equilibrium 
.ouId noc exist). 
where(D = 
timiniShinj 
and l-c means constan. returns. 
increasing 
Hence (R) c 1-c QCNd revenue = pq = Q q = 
The wage and employment levels offered are a function of what the firm 
declares to be the demand for its goods (Q') 
Thus: \~ = \,(Q') 
N = N(Q') 
cost (e) = WN(Q') 
Now, for the firm to tell the truth, the level of declared demand which 
maximises profits must equal actual demand at all levels of actual demando 
Le. D IT/dQ' = O at all Q=Q' 
, 
So ',.¡ha t f'orrns must ':"1( Q f) and ~[( Q t' ,::ake'? 3eeause j JI /dQ I -= 'J :nust ~101d a t 
all Q=Q', it is an identity. The upshot of this is that neither W(Q') nor 
N (Q') can contain more than a single term (see Appendix ( 1 ) for proof.) 
Let us therefore write them as: 
W = kQ,a (1) 
11 = lQ' b k,l >0 (2 ) 
Hence e = klQ,a+b 
and 'rt e . ~ld = 
" 
Q Q 
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(3) 
The (first order) truth-telling condition thus requires that 
= 
kl(a+b)Q ,a+b-l 
Le. = kl(a+b)Qa+b-l 
This must mean either that a = b = O 
or that = kl(a+b) 
and (ii) e + bd = a + b 
at all Q=Q' 
( 4 ) 
(b) 
\ 1 ' 
Let us, without undue originality, call the first possibility the zero option. 
Here wages and employment are fixed, 1 the latter at full employrnent. A 
risk-neutral firm will always choose the zero option. Suppose, first, that 
workers are risk-neutral too. Then the expected wage-bill that the firm 
must pay is invariant to the contract chosen. But of all possible contracts 
the zero option maximises revenue. (All layoffs reduce revenue). Hence i t 
maximises expected profi ts. If workers are risl:-averse this becomes true 
a fortiori. In issuing the zero option, the firm is selling the workers 
insurance and can offer a lower expeeted wage-bilJ.. 
But the zero option is obviously very risky to the firm, and in fact we 
have ruled it out with our assumption that the firm always perfers a eontract 
which guaranteea breaking even to a contract which doea noto Our firm, there-
fore, must choose the seeond type of contracto Using (4) and (5) to derive 
k and b in terma of a and ~, and substituting into (1) and (2), we get a 
contract of the form: 
1 Becauae if both \<Iages and employrnent are fixed, there can be no "truth-
telling" problem and hencs no need for layoffs. 
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W(Q' ) e-a d1d-1Q,a (6) = e-ad 
2.:!! 
N(Q' ) = aQ,l-d (7) 
The fact that the first-order condition is an identity has cost us two of 
the original four degrees of freedom (a, b ,k ,U. The fact that maximum 
possible demand must involve full employment (or no one is optimising) will 
lose us a third. The fact that firms will pay their workers the minimum 
expeeted wage required to retain them removes the last degree of freedom 
and gives a uniquely determined contracto 
III 
Let the maximum level of demand anticipated by firms be Q. As just said, 
Q must imply full employment. Theonly purpose of layoffs is to penalise 
a firm for declaring a level of demand below the true one. But a declared 
demand of Q', by definition, cannot be below the true one. Unemployment 
at Q' would thus simply be a pointless waste. Hence N(Q') = Ñ. But the 
truth-telling condition al so ,msures that Q->Q'. 
Hence N(Q) = N(Q') = Ñ 
Now let us assume that the maximum demand which. firms expect to have to 
face corresponda to the full '3mployment level of national income. 
:. e. 
But: Ñ = 
1.e. 
which yields: 
Q = ,](Ñ) 
N(Q) Hence: 
1 = 
Q = q(N(Q) ) 
l-c-d+ad 
d(1-d) 
:;J 
Rence, frem (6 ) and (7): 
l-c-d+ad ~ 
N Q d(l-d) Q ,l-d (8 ) = 
c+d-ad-l 
W e - a - d Q,a (9) = 
c/d a Q 
Only ene degree of freedom i6 left. We begin on its eIimination by noting 
that the second-order condition for truth-telling requires that a < c. (Stle 
Appendix (2).) Next we use the fact that, ir firms are to optimise, any 
contract must equate expected wage te expected marginal preduct of labour, 
the latter being given by the marginal value product of labour at full 
employment times the probability that full employment will occur (call this 
t) . 
Rence E(W) = t dR (Q=Q) dN = 
** 
The aboye equationgives the reguired expected wage. 
wage will be 
E(W) =J~ W(Q)N(Q) N(Q) prob(Q) dQ 
(10) 
The actual expected 
Further assumptions must be made as to the subjective probabilities of dif-
ferent states of demando If prob(Q=Q) Is t, then prob(Q<Q) = l-t. Let us 
suppose that, wl thin this constraint, the probabili ty of a particular Q 
is proportional to the size of that Q 1. e. that the overall probabili ty 
distribution is as belew: 
t 
o ~--------------~ 
**This represents beth what the werker' s existing firm will pay te retain 
him and ·.hat any other firm '"ouId r,e ore pared to oay to attract him. It 
is thus the equilibrium expected wage across the economy. 
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~ 
This yields the result that 
protQ 
Consequently 
E(W) 
= 
(Q<Q) = 
= 
t 
tW(Q) + 
e-a 
e/d-a 
2(1-t)Q 
Q2 
Q 
O 
W(Q)N(Q) 
N(Q) 
e+d-1 
d 
2(1-t)Q 
-2 Q 
dQ 
e+d-ad-1 
d 
(11 ) 
2(1-t')Q dQ 
-2 Q 
( ) 
e+d-ad-1 ;.~ 1-d S
- e-a Q - + 
-2 1-d 
O Q 
a+1 
dQ 
Henee, 
Le. 
i.e. 
= 
e-a 
+2(1-t) -Id e -a 
= [
t f e-a) 2 (1 t)( e-a.\ ( 1 - d _~ 
l-e/d-a· + - e/d-a) e-ad +2-2'0 
putting (9') and (lO') together: 
td = t(~) e/d-a +2 (l-t)( e-a ~ e/d-a (e-a! 
(a -ad~ t e/d-a 
t 
1-t = 
= 2(1-t) (~) (e-a! - d e/d-a +2 
2(e-a) 
(e-ad + 2-2d)a 
- d 1 
+2 -2d 
-2~ 
e+d-1 
d 
(13 ) 
(12 ) 
Henee a is determined by e, d and t. The solution is messy in the extreme, 
but the important points are that a~e as t~O, as ean be seen by inspeetion, 
and that a~O as t~ 1, whieh is less obvious: 
As t -71, t/1-t ~ '" , henee a( c-ad+2-2d) ~ O. This means either that a~O or 
that a~ C~2 - 2. But a = 9 - 2 violates the seeond-order truth-telling 
eondition. The Cirm would be minimising its profi ts by telling the truth 
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about demando Hence this clasa of contracta must be ruled out and we are 
left with the case where a-tO as t-71. 
Now we can start looking at the prospects for an unemployrnent equilibrium. 
Recollect equation (8): 
l-c-d+ad c-a 
- d( l-d) l-d N = Q Q 
cd-ad 
Thia yields q = Q (l-d)(l-c) 
(Q=Q' ) 
(14 ) 
We have our equation telling us what output (per firm) will be at each level 
of demand (per firm). The curve will be concave, straight 01' convex accord-
cd-ad 
ing to the value of (l-d)(l-c) The adjustment procesa ia taken to be 
a simple "Keynesian" one: last week' s output equals this week' s demand. 
q=Q q=Q,-
/ 
q / 
/ 
/' 
Q Q=Q 
cd-ad ~ (l-d)(1-c) 
stable full-employment 
equilibrium 
unstable zero-employrnent 
equilibrium 
q 
Q Q=Q 
cd-ad = (l-d)(l-c) 
every level of 
unemployrnent is an 
equilibrium 
q=Q¡----------" 
q 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
cd-ad > (l-d)(l-c) 
unstable full-employrnent 
equilibrium 
stable zero-employment 
equilibrium 
311"C dS ~ --71 and a-1O, ':he condi tion f'or ünemployment equilibrium J.pproxl.mates 
increasingly to 
cd 9 (l-d)(1-c) 
i. e. that c + d ~ 1 
i.e. that returns are constant 01' increasing. 
Conversely. as t -;> O and a ~ c. the condition for unemployment equilibrium 
approximates to 
il-d)(1-cJ .:: O 
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i. e. that either e 'l1 (profit-maximising output zero) or that d ¿. 1 (profit-
maximising output infinite.) 
The overall position is that, for given e, the higher the value that t is, 
the lower the value of a will be, and henee the lower the value of d eompat-
ible with unemployment equilibrium. As t ~ O we approaeh the paradoxieal 
position where unemployrnent equilibrium would require inereasing returns 
too strong for any kind of equilibrium. But as t~, we approach the position 
where any inereasing of returns, however mild, will yield an unemployrnent 
equilibirum. 
To eonelude this seetion, let us look more elosely at the variable a. It 
will, as stated, be ehosen by the firm so as to be Just suffieient to prevent 
workers looking elsewhere. But does Just suffieient mean Just high enough 
or just low enough? Is a positively or inversely related to the expeeted 
wage? The answer is unambiguous. A rise in a will lower the expeeted wage 
and raise expeeted profits. 
Effeet on wages e+d-1 
/, l-d :\ 
But 
d E(W) = e¡ ( e-a ) e/d-a ~+2(1-t)e_ad+2_2~ 
~""..!! Let d-a = u, 
l-d 
c-ad+2-2d = w 
d 
le¡ 
E(W) j = u't + 2(1-t)(uw' + u'w) da c+d-l 
d 
...i ( E~W¿'d~ = u't + 2uw' + 2u I w da l-t 
(l-t)Q d 
t 
l-t 
d 
da 
= 2(c-a) ''¡ 
a(1-d) 
EUoJ¡ \ 
\(1-t)Q c+~-) 
(11 ) and w' = 
2c-2ad " 
aO-d)) 
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-d 
l-d 
The second term of this expression must be negative (d<l). As for the first 
termo the facts that c >a (second-order condition for truth-telling) and 
d<l ensure that w, a(l-d) and 2c-ad are all positive and that u' is negative. 
Hence the first term is al so negative. 
da c+~ Q.... ( E(W) "v< O (r-t:l6 ~ 
Effect on profits 
At level of demand Q, profits are: 
= 
= 
R(Q) - p(Q) = QC(N(Q)d - W(Q)N(Q) 
.. ad-c-d+l 
.. ci l-d 
c-ad 
l-d Q 
c-ad 
c/d-c _ (QQ_.) l-d 
c/d-a Q 
c-a 
c/d-a Q 
ad-c-d+l 
l-d 
dE(W) 
da 
c-ad 
l-d 
Q 
< O. 
which can be seen by inspection to be increasing in a. Hi,sher a, therefore, 
does not just raise expected profits: it raises profi ts at all levels of 
output. 
Hence the unique determination of a by t, c and d. Were it to be any higher, 
workers would not stay with the firmo Were it low~r, the firm would be throw-
ing away profits. 
IV 
However, the implicit assumption in the above, and in equation (13) in part-
icular, is that workers are risk-neutral. For only if they are risk-neutral 
can we specify a unique minimum expected wage sufficient to keep them wi th 
their firm, Once risk-aversion ia posited, we must replace this with the 
minimum sufficient expected utility of income, 
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Suppose, then, that the worker's utility function takes the form 
v U = W , where v < 1. 
Then, by analogy with equation (11): 
E(U) = t<W(Q)v +JQ (W(Q)~N(Q) 
O N(Q) 
which yields 
2(1-t )Q 
-2 Q 
dQ 
c+d-l"v 
d rt 2(1-t)(1-d ] L + 2-2d+av-avd+c-a 
Equations (11) and (12) now become special cases with '1=1. 
(15 i 
It would seem plausible that firms, provided their own risk-aversion is 
not too great, can capi taliae on workers' risk-aversion (v< 1) by "se11ing 
them insurance," That is, that they can pay them a lower overall expected 
wage provided that they lower the variance of (wage x probability of being 
employed) across the different states of demando 
We have assumed that the firm's own risk-aversion takes the form of always 
preferring a contract which guarantees breaking even to a contract \~hich 
does not. This simply rules out the zero option while leaving .a11 other 
"truth-telling" contracts available. Workers' risk-aversion does not al ter 
the fact that, if firms are to optimise and tell the truth, any contract 
must take the form 
l-c-d+ad s..:.!! 
N Q d(1-d) 1-d = Q 
c+d-ad-1 
W c a Q d Qa = 
c/d - a 
This limi ts the range of insurance policias the firm can sello All i t can 
do i8 alter the value of a. The question is whether, in a risk-averse case, 
there ex~sts a higher 'faIue 01' a than obts1ns in tne nsk-neutral case, 
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which would both increase the firm' a profi ta and, by reducing the variance 
of the wage, raiee the worker's expected utility despite his lower expected 
wage. 
Consider what happens to equation (15) as risk-aversion approaches infinity. 
As ~, 
E(U)---+ t + 2(1-t)(1-d) 2-2d+c-a 
This expresaion i8 monotonically increasing in a. Thus if risk-aversion 
were infini te, workers and employers alike would prefer a contrac t where 
a took on its maximum value of c. Equation (14) then simply collapses into: 
q= Q 
Full employrnent output is produced whatever the level of demando 
However, equation (9) al.so collapses, into W = O. Workers have insured 
themselves into a zero wagel How can this possibly maximise anyone's utility? 
The answer is that v=O will never actually be attained, but that as it is 
approached, the worker ia approaching the posi tion where his only concern 
is to maximise the probability of receiving ~ income, 1.e. minimise the 
probability of being unemployed, however low the wage when in work. 
But now consider what happens to (15) as the perceived probabili ty of a 
31ump approaches zero. 
E(U) ~ cd - adv 
c - ad 
As t-'l\.. 
c+d-l 
d v 
which (given'c>a, d<l, v>O) is monotonically decreasing in a. Workers, as 
in the risk-neutral case, prefer a to be as low as possible. 
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v and tare thus in a symmetrical relationship. Fix t below 1 and, however 
close to 1 you make it, there ia always seme value of v low enough to render 
dE(U)!da positive. But fix " above zero and, however small you make it, 
there is always sorne value of t large enough to render dE(U)!da negative. 
It is this last fact which concerns us here. Risk-aversion, by threatening 
to raise the value of a above i ts "risk-neutral" level, threatens the cond-
ition for unemployrnent equilibrium that 
cd ad > (1 - d) (1 - c) 
But however great the degrre of risk-aversion, there will be ~ subjective 
probability distribution which will,cause workers to choose the lowest avail-
able value of a, i.e. to choose, from among the contracts the firm is pre-
pared to let them have, the one they would have chosen had they been risk-
neutral. 
This doea not sound like conventional insurance. Discounting transactions 
costs, a risk-averse customer and a risk-neutral insurer can always do busi-
ness. It is true that, in the case we have just looked at, the firm was 
not entirely risk-neutral: we made it rule out the zero option. But it was 
modelled as risk-neutral where the possibility of a slightly lower expected 
wage in return for a s1ightly steadier wage was concerned. And yet there 
is a whole area in (t, v) spaee where no transaction of this kind will be 
'·'lasi bIe. The o~asons lie :'.n the ~estricti ve nature of the truth- telling 
requirement. 
This at first seems counter-intuitive. If the worker insures himself against 
the resul ts of a slump, surely that would deter the firm from inventing 
an imaginary slump. Far from particular insurance policies falling foul 
of the truth-telling condition, one might expeet any kind of insurance to 
reinforce i t. No driver, after ai..i., need -.orry cha,; hl.S ¡nsurers ·.i11 lnvem: 
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a cracked chassis when he has really only scratched a wingl Yet a worker 
who "buys insurance" from his employer does have to make sure that he is 
not inducing the employer to exaggerate hard times when they occur. The 
parado x vanishes when we realise that sorne contracts may hold wages up so 
effectively in a mild slump that it pays the firm to get wages right down 
by pretending that 1931 has just occurred. Complete insurance of both wages 
and employrnent (the zero option) can never produce this hazard : and it 
is rei terated that a wholly risk-neutral t'irm '/lill always offer the zero 
option. But anything short of the zero option is liable to. 
To summarise, then : the more risk-averse the workforce, the more restricted 
the range of values of e, d and t which yield an unemployrnent equilibrium. 
As risk-aversion approaches infinite strength, unemployrnent equilibrium 
approaches impossibility. But as long as risk-aversion remains finite, there 
will be sorne states of expectations (t) at which workers and employers will 
forge exactly the same contract as would have obtained with risk-neutral 
workers. Furthermore, such a state of expectations (high t) will be of pre-
cisely the kind which only requires very mildly increasing returns for unem-
plyment equilibrium to occur. 
v 
The more implicit the contract, the more general the analysis. In this final 
sectioa, therefore I ',¡e emphasise that ~mployers need communicate ';'{i th 'Ñorker3 
only by making current wage and employment offers. Workers communicate with 
employers only by accepting these offers or threatening to lea ve. No one 
promises anything for the future. No one reveals their expectations of future 
boom or slump. And the "declared" level of demand need not be declared. 
Let us start wi th the last proposi tion. Assuming that Q. c and d are known, 
the worker can use his first contract to sol'fe simultaneously for Q' and 
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a. The following week he uses a and the new wage offer to work out the current 
Q', which he then combines with a to "predict" the new employment offer. 
If his prediction is accurate, a truth-telling contract is in force. 
Note that the value of t is irrelevant to this operation. But whether the 
worker finds his contract acceptable will depend on his, and the firm' s, 
respective ·-estimates rof t. .Once again we keep things as Trappist 
as possible by assuming l:hat t is not discussed. There are, of course, a 
large number of ways that subjective expectations can differ between worker 
and firm, between firm and firm, and between worker and worker. Suppose 
for simplici ty that there are only two firms (the analysis i8 not thereby 
materiallyaltered) f 1 and f 2 . Their teams of workers are w1 and w2-respect-
ively. We will concentrate on two particular types of case. 
= = 
Here there is nothing the workers can do about the fact that they see the 
future differently from their employers. W and N are determined by a, which 
depends on the expected wage the firm thinks it mtlst offer. This in turn 
depends on its estimate of the worker' s expected marginal value product, 
both to itself and to competitors, which is a function of its estimate of 
t (probability that the marginal worker will a.ctually be used.) Thus if 
t(f1 ) = t(f2 ) then a 1=a2 , N(Q)l = N(Q)2 and W(Q)l = W(Q)2 for all Q. Workers' 
own cxpectations have no influence on a, N or I,~, and (obviouslY) they havfl 
no incentive to transfer from one firm to another. 
(ii ) = = 
Here firm 2 will offer a better contract than firm 1. Workers will leave 
or threaten to leave f l until it comes into lineo The only qualification 
to this is that, as we have seen, contracta can only be varied along the 
single path of varying a. The better contract (higher eX>;lected 'Hage) has 
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a lower a than the inferior one. But although the o'lerall expected wage 
is inversely related to a, there is always sorne level of Q low enough for 
the expected wage at that level oC demand to be positively related to a. 
(See Appendix (3) I'or prool'). Suppose that demand is initially in this 
depressed state. Then I'irm 1 will initially pay out a larger wage bill than 
I'irm 2. In this case there will be no irnmediate worker migration either 
way. The w1 ' s realise that "overpayment" now signifies "underpayrnent" in 
the next boom, but, rationally, will not complain until then. 
realise that their current "underpayrnent" will be compensated if they stay. 
APPENDIX 
(1) Because d lI/dQ' = O must hold at aH Q=Q', it is an identity.cTherel'ore 
neither N(Q') can contain more than a single termo 
Prool' Suppose that N(Q') at least were more complicated than this: 
N = 
W = 
Then dR/dQ' 
n 
1: 
i=1 
m 
1: 
1.=1 
= 
1 Q,b. i ~ 
k.Q,ai 
~ 
"'dg, 1=1 
where>n 1 
where;¡m . 1 
liQb~ d-j n ¡; b.l.Q,bi -1 
i=1 ~ ~ 
whiCh, because 01' the term in square brackets (d ls not an integer), cannot 
be articuiated into ao aCldi tive series of terms, >3i ther when t~=t.,¿ r or a 1; 
any other time. But dC/dQ' wlll always be articulable in this I'ashion, what-
ever the values 01' m and n. Hence dR/dQ' = dC/dQ' at Q=Q' cannot be the 
identity we require. Hence N cannot have more than one termo 
But then dR/dQ' wll1 only have one termo Then dC/dQ' must have but one term 
(or, again, the required identi ty will not exist.) This in turn requires 
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that C takes the form a¡Q' B + a2 · 
Since N has only one term this must mean: 
N = lQ,b W = ' Qf a Al + k2Q-b 
Consider the three possibilities for b: 
(1) b negative. This makes employment inversely related to demand, which 
violates truth-telling. (Ir b<O, then a>c (equation (5», which violates 
truth-telling. (See Appendix (2». 
(2) b zero. Here N = 1; W = k1Q,a + k2 • But he re negative or zero a 
violates our assumption that the firm always prefers a contract that guaran-
1 tees breaking even. Positive a viola tes the truth-telling condi tion (the 
firm will always do best to declare demand as zero.) 
(3) So b must be positive. But in this case, unIess k2=O, wages Idll app~'oach 
ei ther plus or minus infini ty as demand apPI'oaches zero. Plus infini ty 
violates the firm' s preference for breaking ~ven. The second possibility 
will always be suboptimal but the proof is tedious. We therefore amply (and 
reasonably) aa sume that no one will work for negative wages. Hence k2=O. 
Hence W cannot have more than one termo 
(2) The second-order truth-telling condition is tha.; a <e 
Let x = ad-d-c+l 1-d 
Then, from (3), and the fact that Q=Q', 
dlI 
dQ' 
-:;:--------_ .. _-
cd-ad 
l-d 
cd-ad Q' 
l-d 
c-a 
c/d-a 
cd-ad-l+d 
l-d 
c-ad) 
Q' l-d 
cd-ad 
---r:d 
c-ad-l+d '\ 
Q' l-d) 
~Unleaa k 1 • ~,G, a = Q. 8ut this meana negati ve or zero wages at all Q. 
The firm will lose all its workers to rival firms. 
• 
= 
cd-ad 
l-d 
kd-ad-1+d e l-d 
c-ad-1+d 
l-d 
cd-ad-2+2d 
l-d 
c-ad-2+2d) 
Q' l-d 
AtQ'= Q, 
ad-d-e+l 
l-d c( ad-ed) 
l-d Q 
e-ad-2+2d 
l-d 
= 
(at Q' = Q) < ° :if'f:'a<e. 
(3) There is always a positive level of Q below whieh dE(W)/da>O, where E(W) 
refers to expeeted wage at a given level of Q. 
Let 
Let 
E(W) (given Q) = 
= 
e-a 
e/d-a 
2 2 
e-2ed+2d-d '+ad 
d(1-d) = 
w(Q)N(Q) 
N(O) 
e-ad 
Q l-d 
y 
2 2 
e-2ed+2d-d-+ad-
d(1-d) -
The general rule is that. ir x = log (f~ a) ). where f (a) and K are both posi-
tive and K is independent of a. thun: 
dX 
da has the same sign as f'(a) for all fea) 
has the same sign as fU(a) at f' (a) = O. 
In this case, X 
dX -1 
= da e-a 
e-ad 
= logre-a) - 10g(e/d-a) + l-d 
+ 
1 
e/d-a log Q + l~d log O. 
dX Henee 10g Q has a real value when = O. da 
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ad 
log Q + 1-d 10g O 
Hence Q > o when ~~ = o 
Hence Q > o when dE(W) = o da 
-1 1 
2 (e-a) 
+ 2 (c/d-a) 
< O 
2 
d E(W) <O 
da2 
h dE(W) w en--da 
h 
dE(W) 
Ir en da" 
= 
= 
< O at all Q 
O 
O 
H Q 1 h ' h dE(W) _- O, d~~W) >0, ence when ia below its unique positive va ue at w ~c ~
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